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This latest addition to Michael Dummett's corpus is a philosophical gem: the (at least as of late) rare kind of philosophy book that is short, insightful and elegantly written. Dummett, of course, is a philosophical master. One of the not-very-many whose thought and philosophical endeavours the philosophical community ought to (and does) try to keep track with. The Future and Nature of Philosophy recapitulates his philosophy, his debt to Frege and intuitionism, his take on realism and his key thought that a semantic theory is the basis of metaphysics (with the notion of truth embodying this basis) as well as his fairly recent attempts to 'converse' with both continental philosophers (as with Gadamer, in Chapter 11) and the history of philosophy (as with Husserl, in Chapter 12). But, especially in the early chapters, the book ventures also into important meta-philosophical issues. Dummett takes it that we owe the fact that philosophy is still being taught in universities to the deeply entrenched-but now under severe danger from technocrats and impact-factor devotees—humanistic tradition that has shaped—historically—our modern idea of a University. Philosophy, Dummett argues, is like mathematics in not having a straightforward empirical input. But unlike mathematics, philosophy does not start with arbitrary (or defined from scratch) concepts, but with concepts already in use, that is concepts that are imprecise but for which there is nonetheless some implicit understanding. Hence, he takes it that philosophy aims at conceptual clarification and analysis. As such, Dummett (21) argues, "philosophy does not advance knowledge: it clarifies what we already know". This kind of thought lands him with the traditional paradox of analysis (Chapter 12): if we look for a correct analysis (definition) of a concept, then the *analysans* should be conceptually synonymous to the analysandum and hence the definition should be an analytic truth with no new informational content. Dummett's way-out of this predicament is to claim that

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conceptual analysis might not be, in the end, informative, but that it is still non-trivial because it takes quite a lot of reflection to establish that the *analysans* and the *analysandum* are "demonstrably equivalent" (110). Having said that, however, he does claim that it is not true that philosophy must leave everything as it is—hence (I take it) conceptual analysis does involve a bit of rational reconstruction, too—which is certainly a creative business.

The view that philosophy offers no new knowledge makes it—it seems—inferior to science, which does. Dummett's line here is that science is not independent of philosophy in at least two senses: (a) there are genuinely philosophical problems (e.g., the direction of time) that arise from within the scientific image of the world and call for a distinctively philosophical (that is, conceptual; non-empirical) investigation; (b) the very image of the world as offered by scientific theories raises philosophical questions of interpretation and clarification (e.g., the relation between relativity and quantum mechanics). So philosophy and science are not rivals: they work together to "improve our picture of reality", the chief difference between them being that science "enlarges our field of vision" whilst philosophy "seeks to rectify our vision" (30). Not surprisingly, given his deep commitment to Catholicism, Dummett takes it that philosophy and religious beliefs can leave in harmony. He adds, however, that intellectual honesty requires that a philosopher should follow her arguments to their bitter end and that, if they land in conflict with some religious belief, she should present them nonetheless, even if she is convinced—on religious grounds, I guess—that their conclusions cannot be correct (even though she does not know how to avoid them). This may be puzzling enough if reason is the sole guide in philosophy qua non-empirical enterprise. What is more puzzling, to me at least, is Dummett's claim that a realist view that there is a way reality is in itself (independently of any human representation of it) requires belief in the existence of God and His knowledge of the world (44). The elaboration of this thought—which is not given in the book—might take us in the direction of another great Catholic philosopher of science: Duhem and his idea of 'natural classification' and the world's ontological order that the former tends to match.



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